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Abstract 
In 1995, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner found a negative relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth, and claimed that natural resources are a curse. Their work has 
been widely cited, with many economists now accepting the curse of natural resources as a well-
documented explanation of poor economic growth in some economies (e.g., Papyrakis and ii 
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Gerlagh, 2004; Kronenberg, 2004). In this paper, we provide an alternative econometric 
framework for evaluating this claim, although we begin with a discussion of possible 
explanations for the curse and a critical assessment of the extant theory underlying the curse. Our 
approach is to identify natural resources that have the greatest rents and potential for exploitation 
through rent-seeking agents. The transmission mechanism that we specify works through the 
effect that rent seeking has on corruption and how that, in turn, impacts wellbeing. Our measure 
of wellbeing is the Human Development Index, although we find similar results for per capita 
GDP. While we find that resource abundance does not directly impact economic development, 
we do find that petroleum resources are associated with rent-seeking behavior that negatively 
affects wellbeing. Our regression results are robust to various model specifications and 
sensitivity analyses.  
 
Keywords: natural resource curse, petroleum resources, unbalanced panels and GMM estimation 
JEL Categories: O12, Q32, Q34, O43, O47Corruption, Development and the Curse of Natural Resources 
1. Introduction 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Britain and France gained economic 
prosperity by exploiting the natural resources of their colonies. Britain benefited from gold and 
diamond extraction in South Africa, and France from harvesting rubber and mining bauxite in 
Guinea. During the nineteenth century, land was one of the most important natural resources, and 
land abundant countries such as Canada, the United States and Australia had some of the highest 
real wages in the world (Weil, 2005). Britain, Germany and the US relied heavily on coal and 
iron ores deposits during their industrialization phases (Sachs and Warner, 1995). Indeed, some 
developed countries still rely heavily on natural resources to this day (e.g., the forest sector 
accounts for some 5% of all jobs in Canada). These examples suggest that natural resources 
promote economic development.  
History also tells us that natural resource abundance is not a requirement for economic 
prosperity. Switzerland is one of the wealthiest countries in the world today, but its path to 
economic prosperity depended on the financial and manufacturing sectors, not extraction of 
natural resources. More recently, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan developed 
despite a relative scarcity of natural resources. Nor does natural resource abundance guarantee 
economic prosperity. South Africa and Venezuela possess abundant natural resources but neither 
enjoys a high standard of living, as they are plagued by corruption, civil unrest and income 
inequality. These examples suggest that natural resources have a negative influence on economic 
development. 
Cursory evidence suggests that natural resources are not a necessary condition for  
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economic development, nor are they a sufficient condition for development. However, when in 
1995  Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner found a negative relationship between natural resources 
and economic growth, many economists accepted that natural resources might be an obstacle – 
indeed, a curse – to economic development (e.g., Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Kronenberg, 
2004). But not all economists agree. Despite widespread acceptance of the curse hypothesis, 
there is significant contradictory evidence that suggests natural resource abundance may not 
hinder economic outcomes (e.g., Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).  
So, are natural resources a curse or a blessing? In this paper, we evaluate this question by 
developing a framework that differs somewhat from that used by others. We begin in section 2 
by reviewing the extant literature, followed by a discussion of possible explanations for the 
existence of the curse. Then, in section 3, we provide a theoretical discussion about how the 
resource curse should be specified. In section 4, we develop an empirical model for evaluating 
the validity of the resource curse hypothesis, presenting the findings in section 5. We end with 
some concluding remarks. 
2. Evidence For and Against the ‘Curse’ and Possible Explanations 
In the resource curse literature, the most commonly cited work is by Sachs and Warner 
(1995; also 1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2001), who found a negative relationship between the share of 
primary exports in GDP and economic growth between 1970 and 1989. Although the cross 
country regressions they estimated indicate a negative relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth, the mechanism through which the resource curse operates is unclear. The 
authors claim to provide evidence of the negative effect of resource abundance on growth, but 
their measure of ‘abundance’ (share of primary exports in GDP) can better be interpreted as a  
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measure of ‘dependence’ (the degree to which the economy depends on natural resources for its 
economic livelihood). To be fair, Sachs and Warner (1995) show that their results are robust to 
alternative specifications of resource abundance, but each of these has its problems. Two of the 
alternative measures they test (share of mineral production in GDP and fraction of primary 
exports in total exports) are similar to their first measure in that they really capture resource 
dependence, not resource abundance. (Similar results are found in Sala-i-Martin (1997), and 
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2003).) The authors’ third specification (land area per 
person) does indeed constitute a measure of resource abundance, but, since not all land is the 
same, it is a very imprecise measure of primary sector productivity, as the authors recognize. 
Additional support for the resource curse hypothesis is found in Naidoo (2004), who 
measures extraction of forest resources by using the area of forest cover that a country cleared 
during the period 1960-1999. He finds a negative association between the liquidation of forest 
resources and economic growth rates. Again, this measure may really reflect the degree to which 
a country is dependent on natural resources. Countries that cleared a large proportion of their 
forests in a given period may have done so out of necessity (there were no other feasible options 
to earn income). Naidoo controls for the absolute size of a country (to distinguish large, resource 
poor countries from small, resource rich ones), but fails to control for the impact of population 
when measuring a country’s resource abundance. 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) find that, upon controlling for institutional quality, 
natural resources are not significantly related to economic growth. They also show that the effect 
of natural resources depends on the particular ones being considered. Fuel and mineral resources 
negatively impact institutions (and hence economic growth), but the relationships between 
economic growth and other types of resources are generally found to be statistically insignificant.  
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This is a very important finding, because it suggests that the curse of natural resources may 
really be a curse of particular natural resources. 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) concur with these findings. Upon taking corruption, 
investment, openness, terms of trade and schooling into account, they find natural resource 
abundance to have a positive impact on growth. Focusing on these additional explanatory 
variables may hold the key to unlocking the mystery of the resource curse. However, although 
these authors claim to have found a connection between natural resource abundance and 
economic growth, their measure of resource abundance (share of mineral production in GDP) 
remains problematic. This variable measures resource intensity and not abundance, but, as shown 
by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), abundance of mineral and fuel resources may not 
yield the same economic outcome as abundance of other natural resources. 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) build on Sachs and Warner’s model by re-estimating the 
effect of natural resources on economic growth using panel data and alternative measures of the 
non-resource side of the economy. Interestingly, in every specification they use, the negative 
impact of the resource curse appears in their cross-sectional data, but is insignificant when they 
estimate a fixed-effects panel data model. 
The literature also provides a number of possible explanations for the natural resource 
curse. We consider six possible explanations. First, the Dutch disease phenomenon historically 
described the situation where a rise in the value of natural resource exports caused a country’s 
real exchange rate to appreciate, thereby making it more difficult for that country to compete 
internationally. An increase in natural resource exports could be caused by increases in export 
commodity prices, or by an increase in the commodity export volume (perhaps due to the 
discovery of new resources, as was the case in the Netherlands with the discovery of natural gas  
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in the late 1950s). Economists expect increased emphasis on primary sector production and 
reduced attention to the secondary or manufacturing sector to have a negative impact on 
economic growth (Kronenberg, 2004; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). More recently, the Dutch 
disease explanation has placed less emphasis on exchange rate movements and more on 
economic distortions that encourage growth of the primary sector at the expense of more 
advanced sectors, such as manufacturing (Barbier, 2003). Further, volatility of commodity prices 
could harm the domestic economy by creating uncertainty that reduces exports, trade and foreign 
investment (Gylfason, 2001). 
Second, Barbier (2003) points out that “any depreciation of natural resources must be 
offset by investment in other productive assets” (p.263). However, he finds that in many 
developing countries resource rents are not generally channelled into productive investments, but 
are frequently dissipated through corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and policies aimed at rent-
seeking interest groups. A major focus in this paper is on the relationship between natural 
resources and rent seeking behavior. 
Third, countries with abundant natural resources may have reduced incentives to invest in 
human capital. Temporary wealth from resource sales may cause countries to under-estimate the 
need to accumulate the human capital needed to foster long-term growth. There is some evidence 
that public spending on education is negatively related to abundance of natural resources 
(Gylfason, 2001).  
Fourth, Gylfason (2001, 2002) considers how abundance of natural resources reduces 
incentives to save and invest, thereby limiting physical capital formation and economic growth. 
In his argument the demand for capital falls as owners of capital earn a higher share of output, 
thus lowering real interest rates and reducing investment.  
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Fifth, there is an interesting and expansive literature that examines the relationship 
between resource rents and civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that extortion of natural 
resources provides an opportunity to finance rebellion. Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) 
show how rebel groups have used resource rents to finance warfare and personal incomes; 
resource rents provide income for corrupt governments while simultaneously making it more 
desirable to hold political power. Further, existence of resource rents provides an incentive to 
overthrow the government, while an abundance of natural resources creates opportunities for 
looting and extortion that provide insurgents with the financial means to undertake rebellion. 
Using logit regression to predict the outbreak of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
find that the share of primary commodity exports in GDP is a significant predictor of conflict. 
However, upon disaggregating commodity exports into various subgroups, only oil exports turn 
out to be a significant predictor of conflict. Further evidence supporting this claim comes from 
Fearon (2005), and from Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005), who find a positive relationship 
between diamond production and the incidence of civil war. The latter find, however, that this is 
the case only for secondary diamonds that can be looted, while production of primary diamonds 
(that cannot be looted) is negatively related to the incidence of civil war. Clearly, resource 
characteristics and their ability to generate rents must be taken into account when investigating 
the resource curse.  
Finally, Sachs and Warner (2001) claim that the natural resource curse exists independent 
of commodity prices, but others believe it is a result of commodity price volatility. For example, 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) argue that high commodity prices in the 1970s encouraged 
resource-abundant developing countries to borrow heavily. When commodity prices dropped in 
the 1980s, these countries were left with a large debt burden and a lower stream of resource rents  
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to service this debt. The resource curse disappears once this ‘debt-overhang’ problem is taken 
into account (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001). Similar arguments relating to commodity price 
volatility are made by Deaton (1999), Gelb (1988) and Auty (1993). Interestingly, Deaton shows 
that commodity prices, while highly volatile, lack a distinct upward trend. If real commodity 
prices do not grow over time, any country dependent on them will have difficulty achieving 
long-run growth. Meanwhile, Collier and Goderis (2007) used a panel cointegration method to 
show that commodity booms have positive short-term effects on output, but adverse effects in 
the long run. However, these adverse effects are confined to non-agricultural commodities. 
3. Defining the “Curse of Natural Resources” 
While the curse of natural resources implies a negative relationship between natural 
resources and wellbeing, it is well to ask how this relationship is defined. After all, natural 
resource dependence might result in low levels of wellbeing (however wellbeing is interpreted), 
or it might inhibit economic growth (of GDP or per capita GDP). Alternatively, abundance of 
natural resources might lead to low wellbeing or inhibit growth. Each of these relationships 
might operate through any one of the transmission mechanisms described above. While natural 
resources might affect economic growth rates, a country with slow economic growth but a 
relatively high standard of living cannot be considered cursed. Therefore, the most relevant 
research question should relate to levels of wellbeing and not to economic growth rates. 
Even more important, using economic growth to address the resource curse hypothesis 
may result in spurious correlation between economic growth and natural resources. For example, 
suppose abundance of natural resources is good for economic development. As countries 
experience rising income levels, they tend to find that their economic growth rates decline.  
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Developed countries typically grow at relatively low, stable rates. Furthermore, they may find 
slow, stable growth desirable and attempt to prevent their economies from growing too quickly 
(to mitigate inflation, say). If natural resource abundance is good for economic development, 
most resource abundant countries will be developed nations, currently experiencing relatively 
slow but stable economic growth. In contrast, resource poor countries will tend to be less 
developed nations, and may experience more volatile economic growth rates. Hence, regressing 
economic growth rates on abundance of natural resources may lead to spurious correlation 
between these two variables. 
While natural resource dependence might prevent countries from achieving a high 
standard of living, dependence on agricultural products can be easily accounted for by structural 
change theories of economic development. These theories suggest that economic development 
occurs as economies transition away from subsistence agriculture toward industrially diverse 
manufacturing and service sectors (Todaro and Smith, 2002; Lewis, 1954). It is the transition 
towards manufacturing and services that improve a country’s total productivity. If countries do 
not make this structural transformation, and remain dependent on agriculture, it is unlikely that 
they will have the means to achieve higher productivity and increased standards of living. 
The relatively simple concept of ‘value-added’ can also explain how resource 
dependence might inhibit economic development. Activities in the secondary and tertiary sectors 
of the economy tend to add more value than activities in the primary sector. The process of 
converting raw material into an automobile clearly adds more value than the process of 
extracting those raw materials. Because the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy create 
more value added, economies with large secondary and tertiary sectors support higher standards 
of living. Economies with large primary sectors (high dependence on natural resources as a  
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source of income) are not able to support these same standards of living. Virtually every country 
that has experienced rapid productivity gains in the past two centuries has done so by 
industrializing (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The decreased importance of the primary 
sector allowed these countries to enjoy higher living standards. In this case, the natural resource 
curse seems to be a certainty, and researching it would not provide particularly novel insights.  
Measuring Wellbeing and Resource Abundance 
This only leaves the question of the relationship between resource abundance and levels 
of wellbeing. How should we specify wellbeing? Modern development economists, such as 
Amartya Sen, view development as a multi-faceted goal that can only be achieved holistically by 
increasing material, physical and psychological wellbeing. The common indicators used to 
measure these objectives include per capita GDP, the Gini coefficient (a measure of income 
inequality), infant mortality rates, life expectancy, literacy rates, and rates of enrolment in 
primary education. To address the resource curse hypothesis properly, therefore, the dependent 
variable should be specified in a way that captures this multi-dimensional aspect. A popular 
development index is the United Nations’ Human Development Index, which equally weights 
income levels, health and education, but neglects the distribution of income. However, given that 
reliable estimates of income inequality are only available for selected countries at certain times, 
we employ both the Human Development Index (HDI) and GDP per capita to measure average 
standards of living across countries, although our focus will primarily be on the former. 
We also need a proper measure of resource abundance. Gylfason (2002) identifies three 
possibilities: (i) the share of primary exports in total exports or share in GDP; (ii) the share of 
primary production in employment; and (iii) the share of natural capital in national wealth.  
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However, each of these measures fails to capture the true notion of resource abundance. We 
should think in absolute terms; for example, we could consider the absolute size of a country’s 
inventory of natural resources, or natural resources per capita. To measure a country’s natural 
resource abundance, we should not consider the size of its primary sector relative to the non-
primary ones. Resource production as a share of total goods and services production, 
employment in the natural resource industry compared to other industries, or the value of natural 
resources compared to the value of all of other assets can more accurately be described as 
measuring the relative degree of resource dependence. The problem is that countries can have 
abundant natural resources (in terms of available resources per capita) and not have resources 
make up a large share of exports, employment or wealth. As a country develops other sectors of 
its economy, the share of natural resources in exports, employment and wealth should fall. Thus, 
it is important to distinguish between measuring natural resource abundance in relative terms 
(relative to the size of other sectors of the economy) and absolute terms (available natural 
resources per capita).  
Of the measures proposed by Gylfason, measure (i) appears to be most commonly used to 
study natural resources and economic growth. In their influential paper, Sachs and Warner 
(1995) measure natural resource abundance using the ratio of primary product exports to GDP, 
finding a negative relationship between natural resources and economic growth. However, the 
use of this measure to model economic growth rates leads to endogeneity problems. Suppose that 
the secondary and tertiary sectors of economies grow faster than the primary sector. In these 
economies, the share of primary exports in GDP will decline over time, even if the primary 
sector contributes positively to economic growth. Thus, economic growth is correlated with a 
declining share of primary exports in GDP, leading to the conclusion that the primary sector is  
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negatively related to economic growth. Nonetheless, as long as the primary sector is growing, the 
primary sector is actually contributing positively to economic growth. This is where the 
distinction between natural resource abundance and natural resource dependence becomes very 
clear. An abundance of natural resources may lead to positive economic growth, but if this 
comes at the expense of the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, this natural resource 
dependence may decrease economic growth. 
Others have also pointed out various problems associated with measuring resource 
abundance by the share of primary commodity exports to GDP (Lujala et al., 2005; de Soysa, 
2002). De Soysa (2002) measures resource abundance in terms of available natural resources per 
capita, similar to what is done in this study. We estimate available resource rents using per capita 
measures of resource exports and resource production. The transformation of resource exports 
and production into per capita terms is crucial in determining the extent to which resource rents 
have the potential to increase average living standards in a given country. If resource exports 
and/or production were measured in aggregate terms, then large countries with large populations 
would appear resource rich, when, in fact, the potential for resource rents to impact overall 
standards of living could be quite small. Similarly, small countries with modest populations 
would appear resource poor, even if the available natural resources per capita were substantial. 
Transforming aggregate natural resource exports and production into per capita terms creates a 
measure of resource abundance that more accurately reflects the potential for resource rents to 
impact average overall standards of living.  
In this study, we consider only natural resources that are openly traded in the global 
market economy, namely, agricultural resources (e.g., grain, coffee, tea, beef), forest resources 
(e.g., pulp, lumber), fuel resources (e.g., coal, natural gas, crude oil), and ores and mineral  
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resources (e.g., gold, tungsten, diamonds). As noted in the foregoing discussion, early studies 
treated all natural resources as relatively homogenous, whereas more recent studies indicate that 
the validity of the natural resource curse clearly depends on how natural resources are delineated 
(Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 2005).  
4. Framework for Evaluating the Natural Resource Curse 
Discussions of the natural resource curse must begin by considering natural resource rent. 
Resource rents consist of scarcity rents plus differential (or Ricardian) rents (van Kooten and 
Folmer, 2004, pp.41-44). Scarcity rent refers to the difference between marginal revenue and 
marginal production cost that can only come about as a result of the natural or policy-induced 
scarcity of a resource. Differential rent, on the other hand, refers to the excess of the market 
value of non-marginal units of in situ resources over and above current scarcity rents. 
Differential rents are given by the area above the all factors variable resource supply curve and 
below the cost of providing the marginal unit. Scarcity rent is then the difference between output 
price and the marginal cost of providing the last unit multiplied by the amount of the resource 
provided. Resource rents are greater for some natural resources than others. Agriculture is 
unlikely to result in significant rents (with some exceptions), because agriculture is an annual 
activity that requires inputs of labor and capital each year to extract any rent, and rent is mainly 
of a Ricardian nature. There is a risk that output prices fall between the time of planting and 
harvest, or that adverse weather leads to low yields or crop failure. Further, while the surplus 
from agriculture can be a driver of economic development, rents in agriculture are generally too 
small or spread over too many landowners, or both, to attract the attention of rent seekers. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the resource curse literature finds that “the inclusion or exclusion  
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of agriculture does not much alter the basic results” (Sachs and Warner, 2001, p.831). 
Forest resources offer a potentially much more valuable surplus to rent seekers than is 
generally available from agriculture. Large forest rents are feasible on some valuable sites of 
mature standing timber. However, forests rents are very much smaller or insignificant if the costs 
of tree planting and waiting for trees to mature are properly taken into account, as is the case 
with plantation forests. In many regions where deforestation takes place, it occurs because, after 
rents are captured through harvest, the land is more valuable in agriculture than growing trees. In 
some countries, forestlands are publicly owned with governments having some success in 
collecting related rents. Nonetheless, there are situations where illegal logging is rampant (e.g., 
Ukraine, Malaysia, Indonesia), because of the lucrative windfalls. In the resource curse literature, 
forestry is generally included with all other resources, ignored entirely, or no distinction is made 
between types of forest resources – natural forests that can generate large rents upon being 
logged and plantation forests that generally support processing and manufacturing activities.  
The extraction of fossil fuels (especially crude oil), copper, uranium, and other valuable 
metals and minerals (especially diamonds and gold) has much greater potential to incite rent 
seeking behavior. The reason is that extraction activities are spatially much more concentrated 
than in forestry and agriculture, these activities generate much higher rents, and rent capture is 
generally easier. Without proper property rights, enforcement of property rights and independent 
courts, rent seeking leads to lawlessness and corruption to the detriment of the economy (De 
Soto, 2000; Anderson and Hill, 2004). Resource rents are dissipated in a variety of ways that 
include bribery in its various forms, spending on militias to protect the beneficiaries from other 
rent seekers, transfer of wealth to private overseas bank accounts, investments in overseas stock 
markets to the benefit of the ruling elite, and so on. The point is: The existence of resource rents  
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encourages rent seeking, corruption and behavior that are ultimately detrimental to economic 
growth and development (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Azfar, Young and Swamy, 2001). It is not 
the natural resources that are the curse, but government failure that is the problem. Governments 
do not define and enforce property rights, nor do they protect citizens from theft, which is 
commonly carried out by agents of government. The literature on the resource curse often hints 
at all this, but fails to expand on it in any formal way.
1 
If social institutions such as civil law and property rights exist, rent seeking and 
corruption may not occur to the same degree. However, the relationship between rent seeking 
and corruption and institutional quality is bi-directional. While well developed institutions may 
reduce corruption, corruption may also reduce the quality of institutions. 
Econometric Specification 
To overcome problems associated with endogeneity between institutions and corruption/ 
rent seeking, we employ a systems regression model: 
(1)  yit = αit + β1 x1i + β2 x2it + ... + βK xKit + εit    , i= 1, ...,N; t= 1, ...,Ti, 
(2)  cit = δit + γ1 z1it + + γ 2 z2it + ... + γM zMit + ξit ,  i= 1, ...,N; t= 1, ...,Ti. 
Here yit is a measure of economic wellbeing (HDI or per capita GDP) of country i in period t; xkit 
(k=1, …, K) are characteristics of country i that influence wellbeing; cit is control of corruption; 
and zmit (m=1, …, M) are country- and time-specific factors that affect corruption. Our dataset is 
an unbalanced panel, allowing for countries to contribute observations for different time periods; 
                                                 
1 Thus, Sachs and Warner (2001, p.48) state: “There is an inverse association between natural 
resource abundance and several measures of institutional quality”. But they make no effort to 
explain why, other than to point out that quality of institutional measures is less than desirable.  
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i T . Regressors were chosen on the basis of 
theory, empirical results from the literature, data availability and preliminary data analysis. 
These are discussed further below. Regressor parameters, βk and γm, are assumed not to vary by 
country or time period, whereas, in this general model, the intercept terms (αit and δit) are 
permitted to change with both country and time. Specific assumptions for these intercept terms 
are given below. The model’s errors, εit and ξit, are assumed to have mean zero with possible 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form over i and t.  
Our data are compiled from a variety of sources, although most indicators come directly 
or indirectly from the World Bank. (Detailed definitions of the variables and data sources are 
provided in Appendix A.) We have 366 (=n) observations covering 102 (=N) countries at 
possibly four points in time – 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. A list of countries is provided in 
Appendix B, while descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in Table 1. Monetary 
values are in constant 2000 US$. Forest output is measured in cubic meters of roundwood.  
As a dependent variable in equation (1), we employ the HDI, which is a weighted index 
comprised of income (measured by purchasing power parity GDP per capita), health (measured 
by life expectancy at birth), and education (measured by adult literacy and gross school 
enrolment rate). As an alternative measure of wellbeing, we use per capita GDP in order to better 
place our analysis in the existing literature.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the model (n=366 observations) 
Variable   Mean  Median Minimum  Maximum  Std. Dev. 
Human Development Index  0.718 0.753 0.302 0.965 0.163 
Investment per capita  $1,205 $402 $16 $9,901 $1,835 
Openness (trade as % of GDP)  78.5 70.5 17.2 228.9 38.7 
Number of languages  6.7 3.0 1.0 46.0 7.6 
Latitude 29.138 31.950 0.217 60.167 17.357 
Control of corruption  -0.030 -0.323 -1.324 2.535 0.945 
GDP per capita (2000 US$)  $5,527 $1,809 $126 $39,353 $8,687 
Fuel exports per capita   $229 $24 $0 $8,611 $856 
Ores & minerals exports per capita  $69 $17 $0 $1,010 $145 
Forest production per capita  1.021 0.574 0.000 10.483 1.663 
Regulatory quality  0.152 0.047 -2.569 1.990 0.821 
Largest ethnic group  0.669 0.691 0.120 0.998 0.234 
Civil war dummy
+  0.221 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.416 
Note: 
+ For completeness, we report the standard deviation of the binary civil war dummy. 
 
As to regressors in equation (1), Sachs and Warner (2001) include investment and degree 
of openness in their cross-country growth rates of income, and we expect that these would also 
influence cross-country differences in levels of income and wellbeing. However, we employ a 
nonlinear rather than linear specification between economic wellbeing and investment, because 
countries can expect decreasing returns to investment. Further, given that the HDI ranges from 0 
to 1 while investment per capita has a very broad range of values, a nonlinear relation between 
HDI and investment per capita (measured in constant dollars) seems appropriate, as indicated in 
Figure 1 (n=366 observations). We use the inverse of investment rather than the log of 
investment, because it allows the marginal effect of investment on the HDI to decrease at a faster 
rate than would occur with the log of investment. 
The number of languages in a country could negatively impact both the income and 
education components of the HDI. If the number of languages spoken in a country is large, it will 
be more difficult to conduct business (higher transaction costs), and the income indicator may be  
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adversely affected. In addition, greater diversity of languages makes it more difficult for 














































































Figure 1: The Human Development Index vs. Investment Per Capita 
Latitude is included in the HDI equation to capture other unobservable cross-country 
differences, such as geography and climate, which may affect the overall standard of living. It 
may also be a strong indicator of other important but otherwise unobservable differences across 
countries. Theil and Chen (1995), and Theil and Galvez (1995), show that differences in latitude 
can explain up to 70% of the variation in cross-country levels of income. Brunnshweiler and 
Bulte (2007) use latitude as an instrument for institutional quality in their estimation of the 
resource curse. In our data, the relationship between latitude and overall standards of living is 
quite clear as indicated in Figure 2 (n=366); the correlation between the HDI and latitude is 0.61. 
Countries farther from the equator (whether north or south) tend to have higher overall standards 
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Figure 2: Human Development Index vs. Latitude 
Finally, control of corruption is included in equation (1) because, as discussed above, it is 
through rent seeking and corruption that natural resources may lower overall levels of wellbeing. 
The relationship between the control of corruption variable and the HDI is shown in Figure 3 
(n=366). It appears that the data support the hypothesis that higher levels of corruption are 
associated with lower levels of wellbeing. This general finding holds if we consider simple linear 
or nonlinear relationships between the HDI and control of corruption.  
In the control of corruption equation (2), exports and production of resources per capita 
are used as proxies for resource rents. Potential rents from fuel resources and ores and mineral 
resources are measured in terms of dollar exports per capita, while those from forest resources 
are measured by the per capita volume of forestry production. In order to interpret the resulting 
coefficients on resource rents appropriately, per capita GDP is included in the regression. If per  
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capita GDP were not included, the values of the resource variables would be a simple indicator 
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Figure 3: Human Development Index vs. Control of Corruption 
The control of corruption equation also includes indicators of regulatory quality, ethnic 
diversity, and a dummy for recent civil war. Regulatory quality measures the quality of 
institutions, which may play an important role in mitigating the effect of resource rents on 
corruption activities. If the resource curse does exist, countries with well-developed institutions 
should be able to overcome it. 
The largest ethnic group variable measures the country’s largest ethnic group as a share 
of that country’s total population. In general, where the largest ethnic group constitutes a smaller 
proportion of the population, there is more likely to be sizeable secondary and other ethnic 
groups. In our data, the correlation between the share of the population accounted for by the 
largest ethnic group and the share accounted for by the second largest ethnic group is –0.61. 
Countries with a smaller share of the population accounted for by the largest ethnic group are  
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more likely to have secondary or tertiary ethnic groups of considerable size, which may lead to 
ethnic tensions. These in turn may be associated with a greater risk of internal conflict, and hence 
increased rent seeking. Internal conflict can lead to rent seeking and corruption as different 
groups try to achieve political and economic power. Further, if there is civil war, looting of 
natural resources may be more prevalent, increasing opportunities for bribery and corruption. 
5. Empirical Results 
The dollar value of fuel exports per capita is plotted against the dollar value of ores and 
mineral exports per capita in Figure 4. There are four clear points in the figure that are strong 
outliers, with very high levels of natural resource exports per capita. The four outliers are for 
Norway, thus providing evidence against the resource curse since Norway has a high HDI. 
Including this country might bias the results in favour of rejecting the resource curse claim. Upon 
estimating the model with and without this outlier, we found little impact on the results, 
indicating that our conclusions would not be sensitive to the inclusion of Norway. Given there is 
no reason to doubt the quality of data for this country, we chose to keep observations for Norway 
in the analysis.  
As a validity test and before estimating our model, we decided to find out how well our 
data replicate those of Sachs and Warner (1995, Equation 1.4, Table 1, p.24). The dependent 
variable we use in this case is the growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1998 and 2004. 
Following Sachs and Warner (1995), we included estimates of initial income, investment, 
openness and rule of law. Investment, openness and rule of law were measured in the same 
manner as in our core model. The share of natural resource exports in GDP was derived from the 
shares of agricultural, fuel, and ores and mineral exports in total merchandise exports. With the  
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Figure 4: Ores and Mineral Exports Per Capita vs. Fuel Exports Per Capita 
Sachs and Warner also measure openness and investment as averages over time. They 
measure openness by the fraction of years during the period that the country met certain 
‘openness’ criteria, and they measure investment by the average investment to GDP ratio. One 
noticeable difference is that Sachs and Warner measure natural resource abundance as the share 
of primary exports in GDP at the start of the time period, while we chose to average the share of 
natural resources in GDP over time. The reason is that Sachs and Warner consider a relatively 
long time horizon (1970-1989), while we consider a period of only seven years (1998-2004). We 
used the average share of natural resource exports in GDP to minimize the possibility of getting 
erratic data for a particular country (e.g., due to an exogenous shock such as weather). Sachs and 
Warner measured resource exports at the beginning of the time period because their investigation 
period was much longer.   
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Sachs and Warner (1995) include 62 countries, but they do not provide a list of which 
ones, although they (1997b) do discuss a number of African countries that are missing from their 
analysis and make reasonable predictions of growth for those missing countries. With the 
exception of Mauritius and Togo, the same countries are missing from our data as well. As 
discussed in Appendix B, our data include 88 countries that represent a wide range of economies. 
Consistent with Sachs and Warner, we do not allow for individual country effects. The 
estimation results are provided in Table 2.
2 They confirm our prior expectations: Consistent with 
economic theory, the signs on initial income and the inverse of investment are negative, while 
those on openness and rule of law are positive, and all are statistically significant. Note that we 
are unable to reproduce Sachs and Warner’s finding regarding the natural resource curse – the 
coefficient on natural resource dependence is insignificant. For comparison, Sachs and Warner’s 
(1995) results are provided in Table 3. Their general conclusion regarding the resource curse 
does not appear to be robust. We investigate this further using our two-equation model.  
Table 2: OLS estimation using a traditional model of the resource curse (n=88) 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita, 1998-2004 
 Coefficient St.  Error   
Constant 110.818 23.115
*** 
Log GDP per capita, 1998  -12.173 2.761
*** 




Rule of law  9.368 3.228
*** 
Share of natural resource exports in GDP  0.051 0.231  
    
Adjusted R
2 0.208    
Note: Estimated standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent.
 ***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
                                                 
2 All estimation is undertaken using EViews 6.  
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Table 3: Results from Sachs & Warner (1995) (n=62) 
Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita    
 Coefficient St.  Error   
Constant 12.472 1.978
*** 
Log GDP per capita, 1970  -1.921 0.308
*** 




Quality of bureaucracy  0.370 0.117
*** 
Share of natural resource exports in GDP  -7.806 2.653
*** 
    
Adjusted R




* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Regression equations (1) and (2) were estimated jointly using a systems generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator allowing for the endogeneity issues identified earlier and 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form. The GMM estimator, obtained from minimizing a weighted 
quadratic objective function, is obtained from the moment conditions that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error terms; see, e.g., Greene (2008, Chapter 15). All exogenous variables 
are used to form the systems instrument matrix and we use a weighting matrix that is robust to 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of unknown form. 
Specification of the intercept terms, αit and δit, requires assumptions on unobserved 
heterogeneity; i.e., the time-invariant differences across countries and the country-invariant 
differences across time periods. Possible structures include pooled estimation, fixed effects and 
random effects. As our model includes important time-invariant regressors (e.g., latitude, 
ethnicity and number of languages), modelling the unobserved unit heterogeneity with fixed 
country effects would not enable parameter estimation for these time-invariant covariates. 
Accordingly, we estimated with fixed period effects and no unobserved country heterogeneity. 
The impact of any possible inconsistency is explored below.  
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 The regression results are provided in Table 4. Hypothesis testing revealed that period 
effects are jointly insignificant in the corruption equation, but statistically significant in the 
wellbeing (HDI or per capita GDP) equation. Accordingly, we report results with fixed period 
effects in the wellbeing equation but not in the control of corruption equation.
3 
Table 4: Core empirical results (n=366) 
  Wellbeing = HDI    Wellbeing = Per Capita GDP
 Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error 















Control of Corruption  0.057 0.004
*** 6.793E03 278.488
***
Year 2000 Dummy  0.011 0.010 563.928 410.748
Year 2002 Dummy  0.017 0.009
* 1.036E03 403.728
***
Year 2004 Dummy  0.032 0.010
*** 1.454E03 421.323
***
      
Adjusted R
2 0.797 0.820
                    




GDP per capita  5.16E-05 8.63E-06
*** 5.13E-05 8.40E-06
***
Fuel Exports per capita  -1.29E-04 2.78E-05
*** -1.40E-04 2.76E-05
***
Ores/Mineral Exports per capita  9.07E-04 1.68E-04
*** 0.001 1.53E-04
***
Forestry Production per capita  0.032 0.010
*** 0.028 0.009
***
Regulatory Quality  0.533 0.048
*** 0.516 0.048
***
Largest Ethnic Group  0.199 0.090
** 0.184 0.080
**
Civil War Dummy  -0.110 0.040
*** -0.134 0.036
***
    
Adjusted R
2 0.865   0.864  
Note: Estimated by GMM allowing for unknown heteroskedasticity. 
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, whether we estimated models with or without fixed period effects had little 
impact on the overall conclusions. We also estimated our model using ordinary least squares, 
finding the single-equation OLS results to be quite similar to those of Table 4; the standard errors 




We first examine the results with wellbeing measured by the HDI index. As expected, the 
sign on the inverse of investment per capita in the HDI equation was negative, suggesting that 
higher levels of investment are associated with higher levels of the HDI. This result is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The coefficient on the openness variable also 
has the expected sign (positive), indicating that more open countries have higher standards of 
living, which accords with Sachs and Warner’s model of economic growth. However, sensitivity 
analysis (not reported here but available upon request) indicates that the sign and statistical 
significance of the openness variable is not robust to econometric methodology.  
The sign on the number of languages coefficient was negative, confirming the 
expectation that an increase in number of languages is associated with decreased levels of 
income and education. An increase in the number of languages in a given country should make it 
more difficult to conduct economic transactions and deliver educational services, thereby 
decreasing income, literacy rates and educational enrolment. Together these three indicators 
form two-thirds of the Human Development Index.  
The coefficient on latitude was positive and significant, implying that countries farther 
away from the equator tend to have higher standards of living. Control of corruption was 
positively associated with the HDI, suggesting that countries with more corruption tend to have 
lower levels of wellbeing. This finding confirms the first part of the transmission mechanism 
through which we expect the resource curse (if it exists) to operate. 
In comparison to the HDI results, when the dependent variable is PPP-adjusted GDP per 
capita the openness variable has an unexpected sign and the number of languages variable is no 
longer significant. In the control of corruption equation, the coefficients on each of the resource  
 
  26
rent variables are significant, although the signs vary. The coefficients on ores and mineral 
exports and forestry production per capita are positive, while the coefficient on fuel exports is 
negative. Regulatory quality is positively associated with control over corruption, and the result 
is significant, indicating that, even if resources are a curse, improved institutional quality can 
help overcome this obstacle. Countries with better institutions tend to have more control over 
corruption and rent seeking. Finally, countries with a larger share of their population accounted 
for by the largest ethnic group (less ethnic diversity) experienced less corruption, and countries 
that experienced civil war experienced more corruption. These findings confirm our hypothesis 
that increased ethnic diversity and civil war provide opportunities for rent seeking and corruption 
as different groups try to gain political power. Overall, however, our finding that rents from fuel 
resources are an important part of the resource curse continues to hold. 
To determine the relative importance of our explanatory variables with HDI as the 
measure of standard of living, we report standardized regression coefficients (beta coefficients) 
in Table 5. Such coefficients are also used by Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005), for example. 
We computed beta coefficients for each of the variables of interest by multiplying each 
coefficient estimate from the core model (Table 4) by each variable’s standard deviation (Table 
1), and then dividing by the standard deviation of the associated dependent variable.
4 The 
reported beta coefficients measure the magnitude of each variable in terms of standard 
deviations, providing one way of ascertaining the relative contribution of the variable to the 
prediction of the dependent variable. For example, a one standard deviation increase in numbers 
of languages variable is associated with a 0.21 standard deviations decrease in the HDI, ceteris 
                                                 
4 The standard deviation of the inverse of investment per capita is not provided in Table 1. This 
standard deviation was computed separately as equal to 8.164E-03.  
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paribus. From the table, investment and control of corruption are the two most important 
indicators of a country’s standard of living, while openness appears to be less important. 
Table 5: Standardized regression coefficients (beta coefficients) from the core model 




Control of Corruption 
beta 
coefficient
   
Inverse of Investment per capita  -0.50 GDP per capita  0.47
Openness  0.05 Fuel Exports per capita  -0.12
Number of Languages  -0.21 Ores/Mineral Exports per capita  0.14
Latitude  0.16 Forestry Production per capita  0.06
Control of Corruption  0.33 Regulatory Quality  0.46
  Largest Ethnic Group  0.05
     Civil War Dummy
+ -0.05
Note: 
+Although it is meaningless to consider the standard deviation of a dummy variable, we 
report the civil war dummy variable’s beta coefficient for completeness. 
 
In the control of corruption equation, per capita GDP and regulatory quality appear to be 
the most important indicators of the dependent variable. Although the coefficients on resource 
exports per capita are smaller, they all appear to contribute more to the prediction of control of 
corruption than the ethnicity and civil war variables. The beta coefficient on fuel exports per 
capita is -0.14, and the beta coefficient on ores and mineral exports per capita is 0.15. Bulte, 
Damania and Deacon (2005) estimated the impact of point resources (resources concentrated in a 
narrow geographic region, including oil, minerals, and plantations) on two measures of 
institutional quality: rule of law and government effectiveness. In the rule of law equation, they 
obtained a beta coefficient of -0.21 on point resources, and in the government effectiveness 
equation, they obtained a beta coefficient of -0.27 on point resources. In comparison, the beta 
coefficients we obtain on fuel exports and ores and mineral exports seem reasonable. 
The results suggest that in determining whether or not natural resources are a curse or a 
blessing, individual types of natural resources must be considered separately. If all types of  
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resources are aggregated into one measure, the positive and negative impacts of different 
resource types would offset each other, resulting in insignificant results and misleading 
conclusions. Our results suggest that fuel resources can be considered a curse, because large 
rents available from exploitation of fuel resources are associated with increased levels of rent 
seeking and corruption that lead, in turn, to lower standards of living. A similar conclusion was 
reached by Fearon (2005), who demonstrates that oil exports are positively associated with 
increased risk of internal conflict. In our analyses, institutional quality can offset the impact of 
the fuel resource curse. As indicated in Table 5, the magnitude of the regulatory quality variable 
is much greater than that of the fuel exports per capita variable. This suggests that improvements 
in institutional quality can more than offset the curse of fuel resources. This might explain why 
some countries, such as Norway, have both high levels of fuel exports per capita and high 
standards of living. On the other hand, availability of ores and minerals, and to a lesser extent 
forest resources, might be a blessing rather than a curse. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
OLS is used to estimate each of the model equations separately, using a pooled estimator 
and, to allow for individual country unobserved heterogeneity, by fixed-effects and random-
effects estimation. For the fixed effects case, we had to drop the time-invariant variables. 
Regression results are provided in Table 6. In each case, we continue to allow for period fixed 
effects in the HDI equation but not in the control of corruption equation. We observe that the 
pooled estimates using the independent equations are quite similar to those obtained with our 
systems GMM estimator (Table 4), although the latter is more appropriate because it explicitly 
allows for endogeneity of some of the regressors.29 
 
Table 6: Estimation of the system using separate equations 
  Pooled  Fixed effects  Random effects 
 Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error





Inverse of Investment per capita  -9.277 0.570
*** -0.158 0.468 -1.890 0.425
***
Openness 1.47E-04 1.02E-04
* 1.14E-04 9.04E-05 8.84E-05 8.08E-05
Number of Languages  -0.005 0.001
*** n/i n/i -0.008 0.001
***
Latitude 0.002 2.72E-04
*** n/i n/i 0.003 4.46E-04
***




Year 2000 Dummy  0.009 0.011 0.019 0.002
*** 0.019 0.002
***
Year 2002 Dummy  0.014 0.011 0.020 0.002
*** 0.020 0.002
***





2 0.797 0.995 
  0.602
 





GDP per capita  4.49E-05 3.32E-06
*** 1.30E-05 1.71E-05 6.08E-05 5.25E-06
***




Ores/Mineral Exports per capita  1.14E-05 1.99E-06
*** -3.51E-06 3.07E-06 4.32E-06 2.13E-06
**








Largest Ethnic Group  0.209 0.082
*** n/i n/i 0.341 0.145
***
Civil War Dummy  -0.110 0.045
*** n/i n/i -0.189 0.080
***
Adjusted R
2 0.868 0.982 
  0.607
 
Note: n/i = not included as these are time-invariant regressors. 
***, 
**, 




Many of the qualitative conclusions from the model are the same regardless of which 
estimator is employed. One notable exception is the effect of ores and mineral resources on 
control of corruption. In the pooled and random-effects models, this variable has a significant 
positive impact on control of corruption, but is insignificant in the fixed-effects model.  
The estimates reported in Table 6 provide a means of examining whether there is 
unmodelled country specific heterogeneity. In the core model, the time-invariant variables 
(latitude, number of languages, ethnicity and civil war dummy) allow for some country specific 
differences but other unobserved heterogeneity may remain. Because these time-invariant 
variables are dropped from the fixed-effects equations, the resulting country specific constant 
terms (not reported in Table 6) capture the differences across countries from these observable 
variables included in the core model and any other relevant unspecified time-invariant 
covariates. To test for unobserved heterogeneity, we compare the sum of squared residuals from 
each pooled equation to those from each fixed-effects equation using an F-test. Results in Table 
7 clearly indicate that further (unobserved) country-specific heterogeneity exists.  
We also compare the fixed-effects and random-effects estimates using a Hausmann 
(1978) test. The outcome supports the use of fixed effects over random effects, and it implies that 
the unobserved heterogeneous effects are correlated with other variables in the model, so that the 
pooled estimator is also likely inconsistent.  
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Table 7: Panel methods: Hypothesis tests results 
Equation 
Pooled Estimator vs. Fixed 
Effects Estimator (F-test) 




Human Development  F-statistic: 135.77 Chi-square  statistic:  132.86 
Index  Degrees of freedom: 258, 99  Degrees of freedom: 6 
 Reject  H0 Reject  H0 
    
Control of Corruption  F-statistic: 23.38  Chi-square statistic: 81.64 
  Degrees of freedom: 259, 99  Degrees of freedom: 5 
 Reject  H0 Reject  H0 
    
Null Hypothesis (H0) Unobserved  heterogeneity 
does not exist 
Unobserved heterogeneity is 
uncorrelated with other 
variables in the model 
 
Table 7 results indicate that the fixed-effects estimator is the most appropriate. Despite 
this, we chose to use a pooled estimator because, if the fixed-effects estimator is used, it would 
not be possible to estimate coefficients on the time-invariant variables. Recognizing that the 
pooled estimates may be inconsistent, we re-estimated the original model using fixed effects in 
order to judge the degree to which the inconsistency might affect the results. Although not shown 
here, we find there is little difference between the estimates, which suggests that the impact of 
the asymptotic bias on the pooled estimator is small. However, the coefficient obtained on the 
ores and minerals variable appears to be highly sensitive to the panel estimation technique that is 
employed. This highlights the need for further research on the resource curse using panel data.  
To ensure that the results are not affected by the use of an unbalanced panel, the model 
was also re-estimated using the original data, but only for countries for which the data are 
available for all four years (see Appendix B). This reduced the total number of countries to 74 
(n=296) from 102. Although not shown here, the results using a balanced panel are very similar 
to those in Table 4 obtained using an unbalanced panel. The reason is that there appears to be no  
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systematic bias in dropping observations as both developed countries (e.g., Canada and Belgium) 
and developing countries (e.g., Cambodia and Ecuador) are dropped. The coefficient on the 
openness variable doubled, but all other coefficient estimates were remarkably similar. The 
coefficient on largest ethnic group was no longer significant, but this could be a direct result of 
the decrease in the available number of observations. Thus, we continue to rely on the results in 
Table 4, because, as Baltagi and Chang (2000) show, using an unbalanced panel is preferable to 
dropping observations just to balance the panel.  
To determine how sensitive the results are to the specification of resource abundance, the 
core model was also re-estimated using the more conventional measure of resource abundance, 
the share of natural resource exports in GDP. In this case, the coefficient on resource abundance 
in the corruption equation is negative (-0.001), suggesting that resource abundance is indeed a 
curse, but the estimate is statistically insignificant (standard error = 0.002). This again highlights 
the need to specify an appropriate transmission mechanism between resources and wellbeing, 
and the importance of providing an appropriate measure of natural resource abundance. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
We evaluated the natural resource curse by considering the potential for resource rents to 
lead to corruption and rent seeking, which in turn affect standards of living or wellbeing. This is 
in contrast to traditional models of the natural resource curse that have focussed on using the 
share of primary product exports in GDP to explain differences in growth rates of GDP across 
countries. We also measured resource abundance in per capita terms, rather than as the relative 
share of resources in GDP. Finally, we examined the effect of natural resource abundance on the 
overall standard of living as measured by the Human Development Index rather than GDP,  
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although results for PPP-adjusted per capita GDP are similar to those using the HDI. 
Our findings indicate that it is important to treat different types of natural resources 
separately when addressing the validity of the resource curse hypothesis. Fuel resources are 
associated with increased rent seeking and potential corruption, suggesting that fuel resources 
may be considered a ‘curse’. Forest resources on the other hand appear to be associated with 
decreased rent seeking and corruption, indicating that forest resources may be a blessing rather 
than a curse. However, we did not distinguish between pristine and plantation forests, with the 
former capable of generating much greater rents than the latter. The relationship between ores 
and mineral resources appears to be positive, also suggesting that these resources are a blessing, 
although this result is sensitive to panel data estimation techniques and warrants further 
investigation. Through their impact on rent seeking and corruption, rents from fuel resources 
negatively impact overall standards of living across countries, as measured by both HDI and per 
capita GDP. This effect can be mitigated, however, by improving institutional quality in many 
countries so that rent seeking is minimized. 
While our research focussed on a relatively short time horizon, it would be interesting to 
study how natural resource abundance impacts long-term changes in countries’ standards of 
living as more data become available. This could be done by using panel data that span a longer 
time horizon with longer intervals between periods.  
Finally, natural resources provide a valuable flow of income to various countries. 
Throughout history, some resource-rich countries have grown rapidly and achieved high 
standards of living, while others have experienced corruption, civil war and widespread poverty. 
The relationship between natural resource abundance and overall standards of living is extremely 
complicated, and, before making any general claim about whether or not natural resources are a  
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curse or a blessing, researchers should spend more time considering the mechanisms through 
which resource rents may help or hinder economic development. If resource rents are invested in 
infrastructure and social programs that increase long-term economic growth and distribute 
wealth to those in need, resource rents have the potential to increase overall standards of living. 
But if resource rents are captured by special interest groups and dissipated through corruption 
and rent-seeking behavior, resource rents may lead to lower overall standards of living and 
higher income inequality within countries. The capacity for resource rents to improve, rather 
than inhibit, economic development depends in large part on the role of government institutions 
and the nature of the resources generating the rents. 
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Appendix A: Data Definitions 
Human Development Index 
  Weighted index comprised of GDP per capita (purchasing power parity), adult life 
expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, and combined gross school enrolment rate 
  Source: United Nations Human Development Reports, selected years 
Investment per capita 
  Gross capital formation (constant 2000 US$) per capita 
  Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Openness 
  Trade volume expressed as a percentage of GDP 
  Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Number of Languages 
  Number of languages in Ethnologue that exceed minimum threshold (1% of population or 
1 million speakers) 
  Country observations are time invariant 
  Data available at: http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/  
  Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Control of Corruption 
  Measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 




  Ranges from about -2.5 to +2.5 (higher values are associated with less corruption) 
  Source: World Bank Governance Indicators 
Latitude 
  Latitude of the country’s capital city 
  Seconds of latitude were converted into fractions of a minute and expressed as decimal 
values 
  Source: CIA World Factbook 
GDP per capita 
  GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
  Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Fuel Exports per capita 
  Measures the relative abundance of resource rents from petroleum 
  Measured in constant 2000 US $ 
  Derived from % of fuel exports in merchandise exports, merchandise exports (current $), 
population, and export deflator
5 
  Source: Derived from variables available from World Bank Development Indicators 
Ores and Minerals Exports per capita 
  Measures the relative abundance of resource rents from minerals and metals 
  Measured in constant 2000 US $ 
  Derived from % of ores and minerals exports in merchandise exports, merchandise 
                                                 
5 Export deflator was derived by dividing a country’s current $ value of total exports by the 
constant 2000 US$ value of total exports.  
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exports (current $), population, and export deflator 
  Source: Derived from variables available from World Bank Development Indicators 
Forestry Production per capita 
  Measures the relative abundance of resource rents from forestry 
  Measured by cubic meters of roundwood produced per capita 
  Derived from roundwood production (millions of cubic meters) and population 
  Source: Derived from variables available from United Nations Common Database and 
World Bank Development Indicators 
Largest Ethnic Group 
  Measures the size of a country’s largest ethnic group, as a share of the country’s total 
population 
  Data available at: http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/  
  Country observations are time invariant 
  Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Regulatory Quality 
  Measures the ability of government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
  Ranges from about -2.5 to +2.5 (higher values are associated with better regulatory 
quality) 
  Source: World Bank Governance Indicators  
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Civil War Dummy 
  Indicates whether or not a country had a civil war (internal conflict with at least 1,000 
combat-related deaths per year) during the period 1980-1999 
  Data available at: http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/  
  Source: Derived from Fearon (2005) dataset 
Appendix B: Countries Included in the New Framework 
The sample in Table B1 below includes 102 countries and 366 observations. These are 
included in our core regression model (Table 4). Note that some countries do not have 
observations on all of the variables in the model for each of the four years (e.g., Canada). Only 
countries with observations for all of the four time periods were included in the balanced panel 
estimation (not shown), of 74 countries. Finally, we duplicate the regression model of Sachs and 
Warner (1995) in Table 2. In this case, observations are required on the relevant variables 
indicated in Table 2 with growth calculated using information for 1998 and 2004 (as discussed in 
the text). The necessary information is available for countries in Table B1 denoted with a 
*, plus 
Georgia, Grenada, Hong Kong, Iceland, Oman, Serbia & Montenegro, and the Slovak Republic, 
or a total of 88 countries. Note that, in this case for example, information on the required 
variables is available for Canada, while Canada is not included in the balanced panel as some 




Table B1: List of countries included in various regression models and number 
of years for which information on all variables in the core model are available  
Albania
* 4  Ghana  2  Pakistan
* 4 
Algeria
* 4  Guatemala
* 4  Panama
* 4 
Argentina
* 4  Guinea  2  Paraguay
* 4 




* 4  Philippines
* 4 
Azerbaijan
* 3  Hungary
* 4  Poland
* 4 
Bangladesh
* 4  India
* 4  Portugal
* 4 
Belarus
* 4  Indonesia




* 4  Russian  Federation
* 4 
Benin 3  Israel
* 4  Senegal
* 4 
Bolivia
* 4  Japan
* 4  Slovenia
* 4 
Botswana 2 Jordan
* 4  South  Africa
* 4 
Brazil
* 4  Kazakhstan  3  Sri  Lanka  2 
Bulgaria
* 4 Kenya
* 4  Sudan  2 
Burkina Faso
* 4  Korea,  Rep.
* 4  Swaziland  2 




* 4  Syrian  Arab  Rep
* 4 
Canada
* 3  Lebanon
* 4  Tanzania
* 4 
Chile
* 4  Lithuania
* 4  Thailand
* 4 
China
* 4  Macedonia
* 3  Togo
* 4 
Colombia
* 4  Madagascar
*  4  Trinidad & Tobago
* 4 
Costa Rica
* 4  Malawi
* 4  Tunisia
* 4 
Cote d'Ivoire  3  Malaysia
* 4  Turkey
* 4 
Croatia
* 4  Mali  2  Turkmenistan  1 
Czech Rep
* 4  Mauritius
* 4  Uganda
* 4 
Ecuador
* 3  Mexico
* 4  Ukraine
* 4 
Egypt
* 4  Moldova
* 4  United  Kingdom
* 4 
El Salvador
* 4  Mongolia  3  United  States
* 4 
Estonia
* 4  Morocco
* 4  Uruguay
* 4 
Ethiopia 1  Mozambique  2  Venezuela
* 4 
Finland
* 4  Netherlands
* 4 Vietnam  3 
France
* 4  New Zealand
* 4  Yemen
* 4 
Gabon
* 3  Nicaragua
* 4  Zambia
* 4 
Gambia 2  Norway
* 4  Zimbabwe  3 
 